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I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the twentieth century, courts in the United
States, following the rules established by English courts, generally
refused to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements.' Changes in the
established view of, and judicial approach to, arbitration were sought by
merchants and their lawyers. A commercial arbitration bill drafted by

* Professor of Law, The University of Houston Law Center; J.D. 1984, The University of
Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. Magna Cum Laude 1980, Wilberforce University. The author
acknowledges the research support provided by Dean Nancy Rapoport and the University of
Houston Law Foundation.
1. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001); see also Kenneth R. Davis,
When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of ArbitrationAwards, 45 BUFF. L. REV.
49, 60 n.45 (1997) (describing the English courts' rules regarding arbitration enforcement); Leo
Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 239, 251-52 (1987).
2. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L.
REV. 265, 265 (1926).
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the American Bar Association's Committee on Commerce, Trade and
Commercial Law was introduced in the United States Congress in 1923;
hearings on that legislation were held in the same year, and the bill was
revised by the ABA Committee in 1923 and 1924.'
In 1925, a unanimous Senate and House of Representatives
adopted, with little change, the ABA-drafted bill and passed the United
States Arbitration Act.4 This law, renamed the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) in 1947, reversed the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce
arbitration agreements,6 placing such agreements on an equal level with
other contracts, 7 and establishing "by statute the desirability of
arbitration as an alternative to the complications of litigation."8
Consistent with the goals of its sponsors, the FAA was intended to apply
to commercial transactions and benefit businesses through its provision
for binding and irrevocable arbitration agreements. 9
The FAA provides that written agreements to arbitrate
controversies arising out of "any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce"' are "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract."" The Act further provides for a stay of a
3. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
CommercialArbitration: Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the S. Subcomm. of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 1 (1923); see also Cohen & Dayton, supra note 2, at 265 n.2; Katherine
Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the FederalArbitration Act, 77
N.C. L. REV. 931, 986 (1999).
4. Pub. L. No. 68-401,43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994)); see also I IAN R.
MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 8.2 (Supp. 1999) (discussing passage of the Act);
Stone, supra note 3, at 986 (noting the Act's unanimous passage).
5. Stone, supra note 3, at 986.
6. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974); accord Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
7. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 511.
8. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); see also Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore
Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 79 (1999) (discussing
multiple legislative purposes supporting the enactment of the FAA).
9. Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62 BROOK. L. REV.
1459, 1469 (1996).
10. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
11. Id. "Commerce," defined in § I of the statute, expressly excludes "contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." Id. § 1. In a recent ruling construing that exclusion, the Supreme Court held
that only employment contracts of transportation workers, and not the contracts of other workers,
are exempted from the FAA's coverage by § 1. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119. See generally
Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under the United States ArbitrationAct: An Essay in
HistoricalClarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996) (supplying background on the
exemption issue addressed and resolved by the Court in Circuit City).
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federal court proceeding when an issue in that proceeding is referable to
arbitration." The FAA also provides for court orders mandating
arbitration where a party fails, neglects, or refuses to comply with an
arbitration agreement.'3 In addition, the Act authorizes that arbitration
awards can be vacated on specific grounds, including awards obtained
through corruption, fraud, or arbitral partiality or misconduct. 4
The commercial arbitration regime of the FAA was applied in the
employment arbitration context' 5 when the Supreme Court decided
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 6 In Gilmer, the Court
addressed the question of whether an agreement between an employee
and an employer, mandating the arbitration of all employment-related
claims, was enforceable when the employee subsequently filed a lawsuit
alleging a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA),' 7 a statute providing the right to pursue a court action and
jury trial in cases of alleged age discrimination.'8 Holding the agreement
enforceable, the Court concluded that it had not been shown "that
Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration of
claims under that Act,"' 9 and held that agreements to arbitrate statutory
age discrimination claims are enforceable under the FAA. 20
As we mark ten years of Gilmer's compulsory arbitration rule,
much has been written about the merits, demerits, and implications of

12. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
13. Id. §4.
14. Id. § 10. For discussions of vacatur of arbitration awards under the FAA, see First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947-49 (1995), and Stephen L. Hayford, Law in
Disarray:Judicial Standardsfor Vacatur of Commercial ArbitrationAwards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731
(1996). An additional ground for vacating an arbitration award, not found in the text of the FAA,
may arise where an arbitrator manifestly disregards law. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (dictum); see
also George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 578-79, 580 (7th Cir. 2001)
(applying the Wilko dictum).
15. Employment arbitration "refers to the use of arbitration in the non-union and
non-collective bargaining context" to resolve employment disputes between employers and
employees. Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims with
Special Reference to the Three A's-Access, Adjudication, and Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 231, 237 n.40 (1996). This type of arbitration differs from labor arbitration, meaning "the
arbitration of claims arising under collective bargaining agreements ... must be submitted... to a
neutral third party for final and binding arbitration." Id. at 237 n.40. See generally Martin H. Malin
& Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and
Employment Arbitrationfrom the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993)
(discussing both labor and employment arbitration).
16. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
17. Id. at 23 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994)).
18. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
19. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
20. Id. at 23.
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the Court's decision. 2' This article presents an analysis that goes beyond
the result reached by the Court and addresses whether the Court's
decision is correct or defensible as a matter of policy. The focus here is
on the institutional and functional roles of the courts and Congress on
the construction and application of laws, and on the interpretive
methodology employed by courts in construing and applying the FAA in
the employment arbitration setting. More particularly, this article
considers the lawmaking and policymaking conduct engaged in by the
Gilmer Court, which took away what Congress had given to
employees-the right to bring and adjudicate ADEA claims in courts.
II. CONGRESS AND THE COURT
An understanding of the institutional and functional roles of the
courts in the construction and application of laws is critical to an
informed evaluation of the topic discussed herein. Moreover, in this age
of statutes,22 a consequential question arises whenever judges interpret
laws enacted by legislatures: What methodology(ies) should jurists
employ in discerning the meaning of, and in applying, a statutory
provision to the legally relevant facts of a litigated case?23
The judiciary's role and function is delineated in the separation of
powers doctrine. 4 This doctrine, applicable to the federal government, is
one in which Congress legislates and passes laws through the process of
bicameral enactment and presentment. 25 The executive branch enforces
21. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT 26-31 (1997); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the PrivateArbitration
of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635 (1995); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of
Employment DiscriminationClaims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 1 (1996); Martin H. Malin, ArbitratingStatutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath
of Gilmer, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 77 (1996); Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-But By How
Much? Questions Gilmer Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 589 (2001); Geraldine
Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment DiscriminationLaw, 56 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 395 (1999); George Nicolau, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: Its Ramifications and
Implications for Employees, Employers and Practitioners, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177 (1998);
Turner, supra note 15, at 231; Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996).
22. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
23. Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive
Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1259 (2000).
24. Prior to the founding of the United States, this doctrine was popularized by Montesquieu,
who was "the first to classify the powers of government into the modem trinity of legislative,
executive[,] and judicial." Jack N. Rakove, Judges: Conferring a Lifetime of Ideology, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 2001, § 4 (Magazine), at 5.
25. U.S. CONST. art. 1. "[B]icameralism and presentment were designed to harness the
influence of faction ... by imposing an effective supermajority requirement for legislation." John F.
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those laws, and the judiciary (subordinate to the legislature) 26 interprets
and applies the laws when cases are brought to the courts for resolution
and decision.27
It has been urged that the role of the federal courts' appointed
judges is to declare what the law is. Applying that view, judges should
not make law and should not "substitute their own predilections and
desired policies for the rules made and the policies preferred by the
elected Congress., 28 Taking a different view, others have argued that
judicial lawmaking and policymaking are necessary, if not inevitable.
Because it is predictable that the legislature will not be able to anticipate
all questions that will arise with respect to the application of a statutory
provision, courts will be asked to decide issues, neither expressly
addressed in, nor answered by, the statutory text.3 ° Where, for example,
Congress enacts a broad and open-ended statute (e.g., antitrust, labor,
and securities regulation law),3' judicial lawmaking and policymaking
may be delegated to the courts, and judges must fill in statutory gaps as
they decide cases.3 2
Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretationfrom the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1648, 1650 (2001).
26. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281,
283 (1989) ("Legislative supremacy, as a doctrine of statutory interpretation, is grounded in the
notion that, except when exercising the power of judicial review, courts are subordinate to
legislatures.").
27. U.S. CONST. art. II.
28. Ronald Turner, Employer Liability for Supervisory Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment: Comparing Title VII's and § 1983's Regulatory Regimes, 31 URB. LAW. 503, 508
(1999); see also Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical
Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 744 (1992) ("Why should judges be
able to substitute their own policy preferences through the creation and application of public values
canons for the preferences of Congress as articulated in the words and history of the statute?").
29.

GEORGE C. CHRISTIE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 7-8 (3d ed.

1997); see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 546 (1991) (White, J.,
concurring) ("[J]udges in a real sense 'make' law."); Erwin N. Griswold, Cutting the Cloak to Fit
the Cloth: An Approach to Problems in the Federal Courts,.32 CATH. U. L. REV. 787, 801 (1983)
("Everyone knows that judges do make law, and should make law[;] [iut is rather a question of how
much law they should make.").
30. Eric Schnapper, Statutory Misinterpretations:A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1095, 1107 (1993); see also Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some
PhilosophicalIssues, 82 CAL. L. REV. 509, 536 (1994) (discussing the flexibility of courts faced
with unanticipated applications where there is a vagueness of expression by the legislature).
31. William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common
Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1982).
32. Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1055, 1081-82 (1997) ("In the face of open-textured or minimalist legislative efforts that leave
the bulk of the lawmaking function to the judiciary, courts have responded by incorporating
traditionally legislative activities, such as policy analysis, into the judicial role."); see also Jane S.
Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory
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Three interpretive methodologies employed by courts are the focus
of the following aniilysis.33 The first, textualism,34 asks what the

reasonable person would believe the statute to mean using its words'
common meaning and the popular rules of grammar and syntax.35 Under
that approach, "the text is the law, and it is the text that must be
observed. 3 6 Eschewing resort to legislative history and a search for nontextual legislative purpose, the textualist either views the statute's
meaning to be fixed at enactment, 37 or is instead "concerned with how a
contemporary reader would understand 3 8the language employed, in
relation also to the law of the current day.

Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 41
(1998) ("Congress routinely delegates significant lawmaking powers to... courts through
open-ended statutes .... ").
33. Another interpretive methodology not discussed in the text is set out in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and is applicable to cases
involving judicial review of statutory interpretations by administrative agencies:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted). For commentary on the Chevron analysis, see Orin S. Kerr,
Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998). See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Textualism and the Future
of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994).
34. "An interpreter who believes that legislatures have authority only to pass statutes, not to
form abstract 'intentions,' will describe statutory interpretation as a search for the meaning of
statutory text. That interpreter can be called a 'textualist.'" Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 83 (2000) (footnote omitted).
35.

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38 (1994); see also

DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION

90(1991).
36. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:

FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 22 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); see also Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) ("[I]t is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather

than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.").
37. Peter L. Strauss, Essay, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 228
(1999) ("[A] textualist who sees statutes to be static will be concerned with what meaning the words
of the statute had at the moment of its adoption ... .

38. Id.
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A second approach, intentionalism,39 "seeks to discern the actual
understanding of a law held by the members of the enacting legislature
as set forth in the statutory text and legislative history. 4 0 The
intentionalist "seeks to understand what all of the enacting legislators
actually intended by the provision. 4' The legislators' intent may be
found in text or in committee reports, floor debates, statements by a
bill's sponsor and co-sponsors, and other legislative history. 2 A judge,
employing reconstructed intent analysis, may attempt to discern the way
the enacting legislators would want the statute applied.43 Criticism of this
methodology is based on the grounds that legislative intent is "an
obvious fiction" 4 and a debatable proposition because a legislature
typically does not have a specific intent as to most issues of statutory
application. 5
A third interpretive methodology, atextual purposivism, 6 calls for
the interpretation of statutes via a focus on statutory purpose that is
"derive[d] not only from the text simpliciter, but also from an
understanding [of] what social problems the legislature was addressing

39. "An interpreter who believes ... that the legislature's will is the authoritative source of
law will describe statutory interpretation as a search for legislative intent. That interpreter can be
called an 'intentionalist."' Vermeule, supra note 34, at 82 (footnote omitted).
40. Turner, supra note 28, at 508 n.25; see also REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTES 88 (1975); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 326 (1990) (noting the "obvious
appeal [of intentionalism] in a representative democracy").
41. Theo I. Ogune, Judges and Statutory Construction: Judicial Zombism or Contextual
Activism?, 30 U. BALT. L.F. 4, 17 (2000).
42. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 327; see also James M. Landis, A Note on
"Statutory Interpretation,"43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 888-89 (1930).
43. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-87 (1985).
44. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 211 (1999).

45. ESKRIDGE, supra note 35, at 16; see also Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Legislative Intent, 75
YALE L.J. 754, 754 (1966) ("[Tlhe presence of genuine legislative intent in connection with a
statute is at best a rare circumstance ....); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV.
863, 870 (1930) ("A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which
some two or three men drafted, which a considerable number. rejected, and in regard to which many
of the approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and
beliefs."); David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565, 1570 (1997) ("A
legislator might vote for a tax reduction in order to return a favor for a colleague, help a constituent,
position herself for the next election, squeeze social spending, enhance economic growth, or any
combination of those reasons ....
").
46. Atextual purposivism first "identif[ies] the purpose or objective of the statute, and
then ... determin[es] which interpretation is most consistent with that purpose or goal.
Purposivism ...allows a statute to evolve to meet new problems while ensuring legitimacy by tying
interpretation to original legislative expectations." ESKRIDGE, supra note 35, at 25-26 (footnote
omitted).
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and what general ends it was seeking." 7 Courts, acting as faithful
agents, 48 have sometimes engaged in overly creative interpretations of
legislative purpose.49 In some instances, courts have relied on statutory
purpose rather than the literal words of the statute, where-in the courts'
view-an unreasonable result, inconsistent with the statute's
judicially-determined purpose, would be produced. °
Atextual purposivism assumes that the interpreter can determine a
statute's purpose(s). Where a statute expressly states and codifies the
purpose of the legislation, this determination is a straightforward task."
This approach may not be particularly helpful, however, where a statute
is vague or ambiguous52 or has more than one stated purpose.53 In those
circumstances, a court must determine statutory purpose in order to
resolve the statutory issue. This declaration may provide and effectuate a
purpose not contemplated by the legislature, and may consequently undo
compromises reached by legislators and award to an oppositional faction
47. Strauss, supra note 37, at 227; see also DICKERSON, supra note 40, at 88 (stating that
statutory purpose "refers primarily to an ulterior purpose that the legislature intends the statute to
accomplish or help to accomplish"); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (advocating that interpretation should focus on statutory
purpose); POPKIN, supra note 44, at 131-49 (discussing purposivist analysis).
48. Manning, supra note 25, at 1648 ("[B]ecause Congress was inevitably imprecise in
reducing its intentions to words, a faithful agent more accurately implement[s] Congress's true will
by reshaping a seemingly clear statute that over- or undershot the legislature's apparent purpose.").
49. POPKIN, supra note 44, at 207.
50. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). Holy Trinity is
a prominent example of such an approach to statutory interpretation. The Court held that an alien
contract labor law prohibiting the importation of "any" foreigners under contract to perform "labor
or service of any kind" did not apply to an individual who came to the United States to serve as a
church rector. Id. at 457, 458, 459. "It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers." Id. at 459. This interpretive approach
is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently
words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in
question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances
surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad
meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to
include the particular act.
Id.; see also id. at 460 ("If a literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be
so construed as to avoid the absurdity[;] [t]he court must restrain the words.").
51. See Ogune, supra note 41, at 15-16. For examples of statutory purpose declared in the text
of a law, see 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (findings and purpose section of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (findings and declaration of policy section of the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935).
52. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 124 (1990).
53. Id.
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group "a benefit it had been unable to win in the legislative
or interest
54
arena."
The three interpretive methodologies, described above, should be
kept in mind as the discussion turns to the statutory and employment
arbitration issues.
III. STATUTORY ARBITRATION
As noted earlier and discussed below, the Supreme Court's 1991
Gilmer decision applied the FAA to an employment arbitration case, in
which an employer argued that an employee's ADEA claim had to be
litigated in an arbitral, and not a judicial, forum. 5 The Court considered
the legal effect and impact of the FAA on a statutory claim brought in a
judicial forum by an individual who had also entered into a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement. 6
In 1953, the Supreme Court addressed, for the first time, an issue of
whether the FAA required statutory arbitration. The Court, in Wilko v.
Swan,s7 concluded that an arbitration agreement between a customer and
a securities firm did not waive the customer's right to pursue a federal
court action alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act).58 The Court wrote that the Securities Act "was drafted with an eye
to the disadvantages under which buyers labor,"5 9 and a customer's
54. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 276, 277 (1990).
55. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1991); see also supra notes
16, 19-21 and accompanying text.
56. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. Pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the employment setting
"require an individual, as a condition of employment, to agree in advance to arbitration of future
claims alleging violation of a statute prohibiting discrimination in employment." Halligan v. Piper
Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements
to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1344-45 (1997) (explaining the
Court's construction in Gilmer of the FAA's § I exclusion). Post-dispute agreements apply to the
arbitration of actual claims and are made and entered into after the claims have arisen. Ronald
Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration, and the Case Against
Union Waiver of the Individual Worker's Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135,
140 n.39 (2000).
57. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
58. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35, 438; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994). Section 14 of the
Securities Act provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of
the [Securities and Exchange] Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994). The Court
concluded that the "arrangement to arbitrate is a 'stipulation,' and we think the right to select the
judicial forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived under § 14 of the Securities Act."
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
59. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
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waiver of statutory rights would be "surrender[ed] ... at a time when he
is less able to judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act places
upon his adversary." 6 The Court found that there were advantages to
arbitration agreements, but decided that Congress's intent was best met
by holding agreements to arbitrate disputes arising under the Securities
Act to be invalid. 6' Accordingly, under Wilko, the arbitration agreement
could not legally waive or override a customer's pursuit of the judicial
resolution of a statutory claim. 6' Because Congress did not provide for,
and did not intend to allow, such a waiver, the arbitration agreement was
not enforceable under the FAA.63
Fourteen years after the Court's decision in Wilko, Congress
enacted the ADEA. 64 This federal law, addressing workplace age
discrimination,65 prohibits unfair treatment of persons who are at least
forty years of age or older, 66 and grants aggrieved individuals the right to
jury trials. 67 Prevailing plaintiffs can be granted court orders mandating
legal or equitable relief, as appropriate, to effectuate the purposes of the
law-including reinstatement, backpay, and liquidated damages for
willful violations.68
60. Id.
61. Id. at 438 ("Recognizing the advantages that prior agreements for arbitration may provide
for the solution of commercial controversies, we decide that the intention of Congress concerning
the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration of
issues arising under the Act."). The Court also opined that the Securities Act provisions would
prove less effective in arbitration for the following reasons: I) the statute would be "applied by the
arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law[;]" 2) an examination of the arbitrator's
understanding of the meaning of statutory provisions would not be possible because arbitration
awards could be rendered without a complete record of the proceedings or an explanation of the
reasons for the arbitrator's decision; and, 3) courts possess limited powers to vacate arbitration
awards. Id. at 436; accordBernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203, 203 n.4 (1956).
62. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35,438.
63. Id. at 438.
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
65. A federal law prohibiting age discrimination was originally considered, but not adopted,
in 1964 when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act. At that time, Congress directed the United
States Secretary of Labor to investigate the problem of age discrimination in employment. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 265. Complying with that directive, the
Secretary issued a report in 1965 detailing the problem of age discrimination. Report of the
Secretary of Labor, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
(1965), reprinted in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 16-41 (1981). Congress resumed its consideration
of the issue and enacted the ADEA in 1967.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994). "Originally the protected class was 40 to 65 .... The lid was
raised to 70 in 1978 and removed altogether in 1986." RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE
319 (1995).
67. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1), (2) (1994).
68. Id. § 626(b).
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The text and legislative history of the ADEA are silent on the issue
of arbitration. 69 This is not surprising given the state of the law at the
time of Congress's consideration and passage of the statute in 1967,70 as
well as a legal backdrop which included Wilko's holding and general
proposition that compulsory statutory arbitration agreements were not
enforceable under the FAA.7 ' Thus, questions as to the arbitrability of
ADEA claims were not on the radar screen in 1967 or for a number of
years following the statute's enactment.
Sixteen years after the enactment of the ADEA, thirty years after its
decision in Wilko, and approximately fifty-eight years after the passage
of the FAA, the Supreme Court began to chart a different course for its
FAA arbitration jurisprudence. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp.,7 the Court declared that the FAA set forth
a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements""' and that any
question as to the arbitrability of a dispute
must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration.... The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of
federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand
is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.74
Two years later, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,75 the Court found that the FAA did not justify
an implication that all contracts under its scope included a presumption
against arbitrating statutory claims.76 The FAA "provides no basis for
disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by skewing the
otherwise hospitable inquiry into arbitrability. 77 This conclusion, in the
Court's view, was consistent with congressional intent:

69. See id. §§ 621-634.
70. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SuP. CT. REV.
331, 370 (Dennis J. Hutchinson et. al. eds., 1997); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Compelling
Arbitration of Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866: What Congress Could Not Have Intended,
47 U. KAN. L. REV. 273, 321 n.254 (1999).
71. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
72. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
73. Id. at 24.
74. Id. at 24-25.
75. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
76. Id. at 625. Mitsubishi involved a statutory antitrust claim and an international arbitration
agreement. Id. at 616.
77. Id. at 627.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

11

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 19:287

We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection
afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the
right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or
legislative history. Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party
should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.
Nothing, in the meantime, prevents a party from excluding statutory
claims from the scope of an agreement to arbitrate.78

The Court opined that the judiciary was no longer suspicious of the
benefits of arbitration or an arbitrator's competency.79 Cautioning that its
decision should not be understood to say "that all controversies
implicating statutory rights are suitable for arbitration,"8 ° the Court wrote
that a party agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim "does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum[;] [i]t trades the
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration."'"

78. Id. at 628 (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 626, 627 (noting that judiciary suspicion no longer "inhibit[s] the development of
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution"). The Court rejected the argument that
arbitration was not an appropriate forum in which to resolve statutory claims. Id. at 634, 635. Parties
contesting statutory antitrust claims can opt for streamlined and expeditious procedures and can
select competent arbitrators familiar with the subject matter of the dispute. Id. at 633. Those
arbitrators are bound by the parties' intentions that the dispute be decided in accordance with
applicable law, the Court noted, and "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent function." Id. at 636, 637.
80. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627.
81. Id. at 628. Professor Stephen Ware has pointed out one way in which arbitration may
change and adversely affect a party's substantive fights. Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from
Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 725 (1999). Where
an arbitrator errs in applying the law, a reviewing court may confirm the arbitrator's award
notwithstanding that error. Id. at 725. In that circumstance, substantive rights may be lost:
[Ain enforceable arbitration agreement "necessarily entails a waiver of substantive rights
unless courts vacate arbitral awards when arbitrators make errors of law. That courts
confirm arbitral awards even when arbitrators make errors of law shows that arbitration
agreements constitute waivers of substantive rights. An uncorrected error of law, by
definition, deprives a party of the substantive right that would have been vindicated by a
correct application of the law. Courts do not correct errors of law, that is, deprivations of
substantive rights, by arbitrators, because courts treat an agreement to arbitrate as a
waiver of those substantive rights."
Id. (quoting Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government's
Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 541-42
(1994)).
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In 1987, the Court decided Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,12 concluding that arbitration was mandated in a case
presenting allegations of violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act)83 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO). s4 The Court found no congressional intent to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies in the text or legislative history of
the Exchange Act,85 and found nothing in RICO's text or legislative
history showing a legislative intent to exclude civil actions under RICO
from the arbitration requirements of the FAA.86 Given this result,
Securities Act claims were not arbitrable under Wilko, while Exchange
Act claims were arbitrable. 7 Recognizing this discrepancy, the Court
explained that "the mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the
Wilko opinion in 1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of
arbitration that has prevailed since that time[;] [t]his is especially so in
light of the intervening changes in the regulatory structure of the
securities laws. 88
Wilko was officially interred by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.,89 a case involving an arbitration
provision in a standard customer agreement and alleging violations of
the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and other state and federal laws. 9
In the Court's view, Wilko's "outmoded presumption of disfavoring
arbitration proceedings" 9' was no longer tenable. "To the extent that
82. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
83. Id. at 238 (holding agreement to arbitrate Exchange Act dispute enforceable and referring
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994)).
84. Id. at 242 (holding agreement to arbitrate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994) dispute enforceable).
85. Id. at 238.
86. Id. at 238, 242.
87. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text (discussing Wilko).
88. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233. The intervening regulatory structure is the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and that agency's authority over arbitration procedures is utilized by
self-regulated organizations (SROs). The Court reasoned that where
the prescribed procedures are subject to the [SEC's] ... authority, an arbitration
agreement does not effect a waiver of the protections of the Act. While stare decisis
concerns may counsel against upsetting Wilko's contrary conclusion under the Securities
Act, we refuse to extend Wilko's reasoning to the Exchange Act in light of these
intervening regulatory developments.
Id. at 234. This view has been criticized on the ground that the SEC's "newfound authority
extend[s] only to reviewing the procedures adopted by the SROs and not to reviewing specific
arbitration cases." Bruce M. Selya, Arbitration Unbound?: The Legacy of McMahon, 62 BROOK. L.
REV. 1433, 1440 (1996).
89. 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
90. Id. at 478-79.
91. Id.at481.
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Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the
protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants, it
has fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the
federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."92
Accordingly, the Court concluded:
Wilko was incorrectly decided and is inconsistent with the prevailing
uniform construction of other federal statutes governing arbitration
agreements in the setting of business transactions. Although we are
normally and properly reluctant to overturn our decisions construing
statutes, we have done so to achieve a uniform interpretation of similar
statutory language, and to correct a seriously erroneous interpretation
of statutory language that would undermine congressional policy as
expressed in other legislation ....9'
The Court's conclusion was reinforced by its assessment that petitioners'
substantive rights, under the Securities Act, are not inherently
undermined by resorting to the arbitration process.94
Moses H. Cone, Mitsubishi, McMahon, and Rodriguez de Quijas95
sequentially and incrementally changed the law and jurisprudence of the
FAA; in doing so, the Court established a strong pro-arbitration stance,
replacing any anti-arbitration bias it might have held.96 The legislators
who enacted the FAA expressed no intention to go beyond the statute's
pro-contract policy to a court-proclaimed pro-arbitration approach,97

92. Id.
93. Id. at 484 (citation omitted).
94. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 486.
95. For further discussion of these cases, see Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in
the Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 21-32 (1996), and
Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalizationof ArbitrationLaw, 71 VA.
L. REV. 1305, 1306-07 (1985) (naming Moses H. Cone as a member of the second arbitration
trilogy).
96. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION-NATIONALIZATION-INTERNATIONALIZATION 149 (1992).
97. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (noting the "FAA's
proarbitration purposes"); see also Kenneth R. Davis, ProtectedRight or Sacred Rite: The Paradox
of FederalArbitration Policy, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 65, 98 (1995) (noting that the "'liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration' announced by the Court is a "creed that exalts arbitration as if it were a
sacred rite[;] [t]he drafters of the FAA had no such intent" (footnote omitted)); Richard C. Reuben,
Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1019 (2000) (observing the FAA's policy is more accurately
thought of "as procontract than as proarbitration").
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requiring those who oppose arbitration to demonstrate that a particular
pertinent statute precludes waiver of the judicial forum.98
The Court's move away from its 1953 construction of the FAA
fashioned a fictive account in which Congress always intended to allow
waiver of a judicial forum. The Court, in overruling Wilko, was simply
rectifying an earlier mistake. Thus, the Court cast itself in the role of the
faithful agent of Congress and enforcer of that which Congress had
decreed, as opposed to a judicial lawmaker substituting its desired
policies for those of the elected legislature. Acceptance of this account
masks the fact that there was a change in the law and policy of statutory
arbitration, a change formulated and implemented by the Court and not
by Congress. This change was not grounded in the text of the statute or
the expressed intention of those who enacted the FAA in 1925, but in the
Court's changing view on the attractiveness and adequacy of
arbitration."
The Court's acceptance of arbitration was anticipated. "One
substitute for federal judicial services is arbitration, so it is not surprising
that the federal courts have become increasingly hospitable to
arbitration."' 0 Facing an increasing federal caseload, the judiciary has
approved the use of alternative dispute mechanisms, including
arbitration, as a means of controlling and reducing employment law
disputes and other cases on the court dockets.'0 ' Docket-clearing
98. Moohr, supra note 21, at 415; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn,
Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1263 (2001) ("[T]he burden is on the party resisting the FAA to
show that a competing statutory scheme is inconsistent with the arbitral remedy."). According to
Samuel Estreicher,
[tihe -Court's general approach is to recognize in the FAA a strong presumption of
arbitrability which is rebuttable only by a showing that the particular federal law either
expressly or by implication intends to preclude waiver of the judicial forum. In essence,
the FAA applies in the absence of evidence of an express or implied repeal.
Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
753, 785-86 (1990).
99. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 98, at 1260 ("[T]he Supreme Court has construed the
FAA broadly, with a breadth sweeping well beyond the statute's plain meaning and the probable
expectations of its framers in 1925.").
100. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 237 (1996).
101. Id. (noting the "surge in federal caseloads"); see also Stanley Sporkin, Reforming the
FederalJudiciary,46 SMU L. REV. 751, 757 (1992) (arguing that cases brought under Title VU and
other statutes are crowding court dockets). The late Chief Justice Warren Burger was an early and
consistent proponent of utilizing arbitration as a substitute for court litigation. WARREN W. [sic]
BURGER, ISN'T THERE A BETTER WAY? ANNUAL REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY (1982),
reprinted in DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 13-15 (Leonard L. Riskin & James E. Westbrook
eds., 2d ed. 1997); Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic
Anticipation, Address Before the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice (April 7, 1996), in 70 F.R.D. 83, 94 (1976).
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decisions are driven by a policy goal to clear court dockets and, with the
same sweep, rid the court of cases considered less prestigious or
worthy. 102
IV. THE EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION ISSUE
In Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., °3 the Court extended
its pro-arbitration approach by holding an agreement to arbitrate
statutory age discrimination claims enforceable. '° The specific question
before the Court was whether a claim under the ADEA could "be
subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement
in a securities registration application.' ' 0 5 Robert Gilmer, hired by the
employer in May 1981, as a manager of financial services, registered (as
he was required to do) as a securities representative with the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and other stock exchanges.'0 6 The application
provided that Gilmer agreed to "'arbitrate any dispute, claim or
controversy"' arising out of his employment "'that is required to be
arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organizations
with which [he] register[ed]."""' "NYSE Rule 347 provide[d] for
arbitration of '[any controversy between a registered representative and
any member or member organization arising out of the employment or
termination of employment of such registered representative."" 8
Terminated by his employer in 1987, Gilmer, then 62 years of age,
filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and sought to pursue an ADEA
lawsuit in federal district court. 09 The employer moved to compel
arbitration; that motion was denied."0 Reversing the district court's
decision and adopting a position rejected by other federal courts of
appeals,"' the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

102. Nicolau, supra note 21, at 181-82.
103. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
104. Id. at 23.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix).
108. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (quoting Appendix to Brief for Respondent).
109. Id. at 23-24.
110. Id. at 24.
111. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 105 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated by 500
U.S. 930 (1991), remanded to 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1099 (2000);
Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (lst Cir. 1989); Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877
F.2d 221, 230, 231 (3d Cir. 1989); Swenson v. Mgmt. Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1307
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found "no congressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration
agreements1 2in the ADEA's text, its legislative history, or its underlying
purposes."'
By a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's
decision regarding Gilmer's claims. "3 Justice White's opinion for the
Court makes clear that statutory claims may be subjected to an FAA
enforceable arbitration agreement. 14 Not every statutory claim may be
appropriate for arbitration. 15' However, a party who agrees to arbitrate
"'should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue. ' ,,1 6 The burden of establishing congressional intent to preclude
waiver rested with Gilmer, with that intent "discoverable in the text of
the ADEA, its legislative history, or an 'inherent conflict' between
arbitration and the ADEA's underlying purposes.' 1 7 Further, Justice
White continued, the federal policy (created and pronounced by the
Court) favoring arbitration must be considered when resolving questions
of arbitrability of a statutory claim. 8
Gilmer conceded, as he had to, that there was nothing in the text or
legislative history of the ADEA indicating Congress's intent to preclude
arbitration," 9 thereby rendering
textualist and intentionalist
methodologies inoperable.'20 One could argue that this silence of
statutory text or statutory history should have resolved the case in
Gilmer's favor, for Congress did not explicitly state or otherwise
indicate that ADEA claims could be subject to compulsory arbitration.
Such silence, viewed from Gilmer's perspective, could have been
golden. The Court, however, pressed on into the realm of atextual
purposivism,12' and Gilmer's case thus depended on the Court's answer
to the question of whether arbitration conflicted with the purposes of the
ADEA. That determination, in turn, would depend upon the Court's
(8th Cir. 1988); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1553 (10th Cir. 1988);
Johnson v. Univ. of Wis.-Milwaukee, 783 F.2d 59, 62 (7th Cir. 1986).
112. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1990), affd, 500
U.S. 20 (1991).
113. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 22 (listing the Justices' votes).
114. Id. at 26.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
117. Id.
118. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
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articulation and evaluation of the statute's purposes, an enterprise
providing ample opportunity for judicial lawmaking and policymaking.
The Court found no inherent conflict between the ADEA's
purposes of providing for actions to address workplace grievances,
furthering "important social policies," and the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims. 22 According to the
Court, the statute's broader social purposes can be furthered in both
arbitration and in the courts,'23 and arbitration does not undermine the
EEOC's role in fighting age discrimination. 4 Claimants subject to
arbitration agreements precluding court actions can still file
discrimination charges with the EEOC, as did Gilmer, and the agency
can investigate claims of discrimination in the absence of an individual's
charge. 25Moreover, the Court continued, because discrimination claims
may be settled without the agency's participation, nothing in the ADEA
requires EEOC involvement in all employment disputes. 26 The Court
opined that "the mere involvement of an administrative agency in the
enforcement of a statute is not sufficient to preclude arbitration."'27
Gilmer also argued that compelling arbitration was improper
because he would be deprived of the court forum provided by the
ADEA. 2 ' Not so, said the Court: "Congress... did not explicitly
122. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27.
123. Id. at 27-28.
124. The ADEA rests enforcement authority with the EEOC. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1994).
Employee charges of age discrimination must be filed with the agency. Id. § 626(b). The EEOC
"shall attempt to eliminate the discriminhtory practice or practices alleged, and to effect voluntary
compliance. .. through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion." Id. Where
conciliation of a meritorious charge is not successful, the EEOC may bring suit in court, an action
that terminates an individual employee's right to file her own action. Id. § 626(c)(1). If the agency
does not sue, the employee may bring her own claim in court and may ask for a jury trial. Id. §
626(c)(2). The EEOC may also issue a right-to-sue letter allowing the employee to bring a court
action. Id. § 626(e); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994 & Supp. 2000). In a recent ruling, the
Supreme Court made it clear that an arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee
does not bar the EEOC from seeking victim-specific relief on behalf of the employee. EEOC v.
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
125. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
126. Id. (citing supporting decisions). As amended by the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act, the ADEA provides that individuals may knowingly and voluntarily waive ADEA rights and
claims that do not arise after the date the waiver is executed. 29 U.S.C. § 626(0 (1994); see also
Michael C. Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion, and the Prospective Waiver of ADEA
Rights: The Failure of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1294-98
(1993) (criticizing conditional age-based exit incentives as prospective waivers).
127. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28-29. In support of this point, the Court noted that the SEC "is
heavily involved in the enforcement of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act
of 1933, but we have held that claims under both of those statutes may be subject to compulsory
arbitration." Id. at 29.
128. Id. at 29.
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preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial resolution of claims, even in its
recent amendments to the ADEA.' 29 Relying on the ADEA's flexible
resolution of claims' 30 and the statute's conciliation requirement, the
Court reasoned that "out-of-court dispute resolution, such as arbitration,
is consistent with the statutory scheme established by Congress.' 13' This
aspect of the Court's decision cannot withstand scrutiny. EEOC
conciliation seeks to settle what the agency deems to be meritorious
charges of discrimination. 132 This specific out-of-court dispute
resolution, in which an agreed-upon and voluntary settlement of a charge
is sought in a procedure administered by the EEOC, is far different from,
and should not be likened
to or confused with, formal and binding
3
compulsory arbitration.
The Court also determined that arbitration is consistent with the
ADEA's grant of concurrent jurisdiction over age discrimination claims
to federal and state courts. 34 The Court in Gilmer reasoned that both
arbitration agreements and the concurrent jurisdiction provision allow
ADEA claimants options with respect to the forum in which a dispute
will be resolved. 35 The concurrent jurisdiction provision allows
claimants to choose between two judicial fora, the state or federal courts,
both providing for discovery, jury trials, and other indicia of judicial
process and administration. 116 The benefits inured with choosing between
competent jurisdictions are not available in, or similar to, compulsory
arbitration, which does not afford the option of a court and jury."'
The Court then spent several pages rejecting Gilmer's challenges to
the adequacy of arbitration as a forum for the litigation of statutory age
discrimination claims.'38 To summarize what is discussed in detail
elsewhere, 3 9 the Court noted its rejection of generalized attacks on

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28.
133. Id. at 34 (contrasting arbitrator's powers with statutory rights for Title VII claims).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1994).
135. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29.
136. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626 n.254 (West 1999) (reporting decisions upholding concurrent
jurisdiction for ADEA claims); see also 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3527 (2d ed. 1984).
137. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 & n.4 (1956) (enumerating
deficiencies in arbitration rules for discovery, evidence, and reviewability).
138. Gilmer,500 U.S. at 30-33.
139. See Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a
Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1473-82 (1996) (detailing and
commenting on each of the Court's findings).
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arbitration;140 declined to presume that arbitrators will be biased; 41
concluded that arbitral discovery was sufficient and that Gilmer would
have a fair opportunity to present his claims under the NYSE discovery
rules; 42 and reasoned that arbitration would not hinder public knowledge

of an employer's discrimination,
effective judicial review, or the
4
development of the law. 1
Additionally, the Court concluded that the purposes of the ADEA,
achievable through class actions, could be furthered in NYSE collective
arbitration proceedings, as well as EEOC-initiated class actions.'"
Gilmer's argument that agreements to arbitrate ADEA claims should not
be enforced because of unequal bargaining power between employers
and employees was also rejected. 45 "Mere inequality in bargaining
power... is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements
are never enforceable in the employment context.' 46 For all of the
foregoing reasons, the Court concluded that Gilmer "ha[d] not met his
burden of showing that Congress, in enacting47 the ADEA, intended to
preclude arbitration of claims under that Act."'

140. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
141. Id.
142. Id.
at 31.
143. Id. at 31-32.
144. Id.
at 32.
145. McGinley, supra note 139, at 1475-76 (finding the Court's rejection of Gilmer's unequal
bargaining power argument "troublesome").
146. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 ("There is no indication in this case ... that Gilmer, an
experienced businessman, was coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his
registration application ...[;] this claim of unequal bargaining power is best left for resolution in
specific cases.").
147. Id. at 35. In the wake of Gilmer, courts have generally held that employees subject to predispute arbitration agreements may be compelled to submit race, sex, age, and disability
discrimination claims to arbitration. See, e.g., Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238
F.3d 549, 552 (4th Cir. 2001); Lyster v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 239 F.3d 943, 947 (8th
Cir. 2001); Haskins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 230 F.3d 231, 232 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1113 (2001); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11th Cir. 2000);
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 12 (lst Cir. 1999);
Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 362, 367 (7th Cir. 1999); Seus v. John
Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1998); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832,
837, 838 (8th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1469-70, 1488 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1991); Williams v. Katten,
Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430, 1431, 1433 (N.D. I1. 1993). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has taken a contrary view, holding that employees cannot be
compelled to arbitrate Title VII claims. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182,
1185, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Given the Court's FAA decisions and jurisprudence of the 1980s,
Gilmer was predictable, if not inevitable.148 The Court's move from a
pro-contract to a pro-arbitration reading and application of the FAA, and
its conclusion that plaintiffs' statutory claims arising under securities
and racketeering laws had to be resolved in arbitration pursuant to
predispute agreements, 149 provided the analytical framework applicable
to Gilmer's claim that he did not have to ,arbitrate his ADEA claim.
Under that framework, the Court asked whether Congress intended to
preclude arbitration of age discrimination claims and answered that
query in the negative.5
That answer, based on a fictive intent, not expressed in statutory
text or legislative history, or considered by the Congress enacting the
ADEA in 1967, is not obviously and indisputably correct. Congress
could not have expressed an intent on an issue it had not contemplated.
Given the state of FAA-based arbitration law in 1967, there was no
reason for Congress to consider the arbitrability issue. "Thus, it is hardly
surprising that Congress did not see fit, in either the language of the
statute or its legislative history, to specify that courts should not compel
arbitration" of ADEA claims.'' Placing the burden on the plaintiff to
show that the ADEA-enacting Congress intended to preclude arbitration
required Gilmer to find and prove a nonexistence. To rule against him,
when he was unsurprisingly unable to meet that burden, is to give
operative effect to the Court's approach to, and view of, arbitration and
not the congressional intent.
To conclude (as the Court did in Gilmer) that the ADEA does not
preclude arbitration flows not from the intent of Congress, but from the
Court's own policy preferences and broad reading of the FAA. While
those preferences and readings may lead to desired policy outcomes,
observers interested in statutory interpretations and methodologies
should be concerned with the methodology employed by the Court in
identifying and evaluating the ADEA's purposes. The search for
legislative purpose in a statute that is silent, vague, or ambiguous on a
specific issue allows a court to construct or reconstruct and determinein its view-congressional purpose, congressional intent, and how
148. See Nicolau, supra note 21, at 182 ("Against this backdrop, the result in Gilmer, at least to
those who closely followed the Court, should have come as no surprise in 1991.").
149. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987).
150. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29.
151. Sternlight, supra note 70, at 322 (applying this point to the Civil Rights Act of 1866); see
also Carrington & Haagen, supra note 70, at 370 ("[T]he ADEA... was written at a time when it
would have been almost unthinkable that any federal court would have enforced an agreement
subjecting otherwise justiciable civil rights claims to arbitral jurisdiction.").
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Congress would answer the statutory question. While that determination
could yield plausible, defensible, and purposive constructions of statutes,
we should not lose sight of the fact that what might be left is a judicially
imagined view of statutory purpose and not the actual view and intent of
those who enacted the law.
To say this is not to say that the Court necessarily erred, as a matter
of policy, in requiring Gilmer to arbitrate his age discrimination lawsuit.
Enforcing agreements to arbitrate ADEA and other statutory
employment claims may or may not be advantageous and beneficial to
employers, employees, and the courts. Arbitration may or may not
provide more protection to employees than does court litigation of such
claims. These are debatable matters calling for scholarly examination
and empirical analysis. 52 One can agree with the policy approach and
result reached in a case however, and still question the methodology
employed by the Court in reaching that result. 5 3 For those who proclaim
that what counts is the enacting legislature's intent and command, and
not a court's preferences and desired policies, Gilmer's "imaginative
elaboration of legislative purpose' ' 5 4 is problematic because it certainly
provides more room for judicial lawmaking and policymaking, than does
statutory interpretation tethered to text and legislative history.
V. CONCLUSION
Gilmer's conclusion that Congress did not intend to preclude the
arbitration of ADEA claims is based on a fictive and judicially-created
152. Compare Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 443 n.158 (2000) (calling
for development of empirical methods to evaluate alternative systems of dispute resolution), with
Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study of
Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 735, 757-58 (2001) (questioning the
effectiveness of empirical research in evaluating arbitration).
153. Some commentators agree with the results reached by the Supreme Court in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but disagree with
the Court's analysis. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 67 (1998) ("Brown is an example of a decision that likely was correct the day it
was decided, but failed to make a proper historical case."); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a
Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1200 (1992) ("Roe... might have been less of a storm
center had it both homed in more precisely on the women's equality dimension of the issue and,
correspondingly, attempted nothing more bold at that time than the mode of decisionmaking the
Court employed in the 1970s gender classification cases."(footnote omitted)); Calvin R. Massey,
The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 49, 102 n.265 (1992)
(arguing that Roe was not decided wrongly as a matter of constitutional law, but that the Court erred
by treating the putative right as an unenumerated natural right).
154. POPKIN, supra note 44, at 207.
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and judicially-imposed statutory "intent" grounded in the Court's own
preference for arbitration. Significantly, this decision serves as an
illustration of the way in which the Court goes outside of statutory text
and legislative history to engage in lawmaking and policymaking.
For subscribers to the view that the Court should only interpret and
enforce legislative commands and must never make law, Gilmer presents
important and interesting questions concerning the legitimacy of the
Court's approach. These questions include whether the Court substituted
its policy preferences for the policies and rules of law set out by
Congress, and whether it is possible for the Court and lower courts to
avoid some level of lawmaking and policymaking as part of the
adjudicative enterprise under circumstances like those presented in
Gilmer. Subscribers to the belief that judicial lawmaking and
policymaking are legitimate and necessary must consider how far
beyond text and legislative history courts can or should go in
determining statutory purposes and dictates. These believers should be
cognizant of the fact that judges and lawyers, skilled in rhetoric and
persuasive argumentation, will be able, to construct or reconstruct
legislative "intent" when explaining why one interpretation of a statutory
provision is favored over another. These questions, and plausible,
persuasive answers thereto, deserve the attention of all interested in law
and affected by statutory interpretation and application.
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